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This thesis argues that the U.S./U.N. intervention in Somalia in 1992-1994 
represents an attempt to use coercive diplomacy to re-create the Somali state. It 
further argues that the pre-conditions for a successful use of coercive diplomacy 
existed initially during the U.S.-led United Task Force (UNITAF) phase, but they 
quickly disappeared during the expanded mission of United Nations Somalia II 
(UNOSOM II). 
This thesis proposes that UNITAF leadership were quite successful in 
accomplishing their limited objectives. Additionally, when UNOSOM II assumed 
the mission in Somalia, the expanded mandates and policies chosen by both the 
U.S. and the U.N. changed the conditions for success and led the UNOSOM II 
forces to war with members of the Somali militia. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The world community has experienced a plethora of failed states since 
the end of the Cold War. Cold War diplomatic and military solutions for 
handling crisis situations do not necessarily apply to non-state actors in these 
former states. The United Nations and the United States, along with the rest 
of the world, are finding it increasingly difficult to locate solutions to these 
complex problems. 
Analysis of the United Nations intervention in Somalia provides insight 
into the problems involved in restructuring a state that has fallen into anarchy. 
The motivation to defend against the expansion of Communism no longer 
drives the policy makers in either the U.N. or the U.S. Humanitarian 
intervention coupled with communal conflict mediation may create different 
problems than policy makers have become accustomed to. 
Alexander George has conducted extensive analysis of state to state 
conflicts when the U.S. has chosen a policy option that he calls coercive 
diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy can be an attractive strategy to policy makers 
because it theoretically offers the country a chance to achieve aims with less 
cost in blood and treasure than a more conventional military approach. 
Therefore, if force is used at all, it is not part of a conventional military strategy 
that seeks to destroy the enemy's military forces or their support base. Force 
must be a component of a more complex political-diplomatic strategy for 
resolving a conflict of interests, which is why coercive diplomacy is an 
ix 
His analysis has identified eight pre-conditions that must be present for 
coercive diplomacy to have a strong likelihood of success. Those eight are: 
1. Strength of United States motivation 
2. Asymmetry of motivation favoring the United States 
3. Clarity of American Objectives 
4. Sense of urgency to achieve the American objective 
5. Adequate domestic political support 
6. Usable military options 
7. Opponent's fear of unacceptable escalation 
8. Clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement 
The methodology for this study merges George's pre-conditions for 
simplicity's sake as follows: 
1. Usable Military Options 
2. Asymmetry of Motivation favoring the United States 
3. A basis for diplomacy 
4. Clarity of American Objective 
5. Adequate Domestic Support 
What were the goals of the United States and the United Nations in 
Somalia? What were the strategies and how were they implemented? What 
were the limitations that were inherent in these operations and were they 
recognized? These are some of the important questions about the U.S. role in 
x 
Somalia. The United States (while supporting the United Nations objectives 
implicitly in some cases and explicitly in others) embarked on what amounted 
to a strategy of coercive diplomacy in order to recreate the Somali state. The 
coercive diplomacy strategy was directed at the various faction leaders in 
Somalia but was especially targeted toward the leader of the Somali National 
Alliance (SNA), Muhammad Farrah Aideed. The failure of this strategy during 
UNOSOM II eventually led the U.S. and the U.N. into open warfare against 
militia members loyal to Aideed. 
This thesis will argue that conditions for successful use of coercive 
diplomacy existed or were created in Somalia during the United Task Force 
(UNITAF) phase of operations in Somalia. Additionally, it will explore how and 
why those conditions quickly evaporated when the U.S. supported the more 
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"All in all the emerging world is likely to lack the clarity and 
stability of the cold war and to be a more junglelike world of 
multiple dangers, hidden traps, unpleasant surprises and moral 
ambiguities." 
Samuel P. Huntington 
The United States experience in Somalia from December, 1992 until the 
pullout of combat troops in March, 1994 led to divisive debates over the role of 
the United States in Peacekeeping and Humanitarian intervention.1 Some 
argue that the US paid a small price in blood and treasure in Somalia to learn, 
once again, to never become involved in foreign internal conflicts.2 Others 
argue that wrongly applying the United States (U.S.) and United Nations (UN.) 
experience in Somalia as a model of failure will keep the United States from 
intervening when there are clear vital national security or humanitarian 
interests.3 Still others point to the success that UNITAF achieved from 
December 1992 - May 1993 in saving thousands from starvation.4 There is little 
debate however that the United States and the United Nations suffered a loss 
'A search of congressional records since June of 1993 shows a marked increase in Congressional leaders using 
the US and UN failed effort in Somalia as proof that the US has no interests in resolving domestic political 
disputes of foreign countries. During this time, the US was debating whether to intervene in Bosnia, Rwanda, 
Sudan, and Haiti. 
2For this view see Adam Roberts, 'The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping," Survival, Autumn 1994; and 'The Road to 
Hell...A Critique of Humanitarian Intervention," Harvard International Review, Fall 1993. See also David Rieff, 
'The Illusions of Peacekeeping," World Policy Journal,, Fall 1994. 
3For this view see, see the following editorials, 'The Future of U.N. Peacekeeping," New York Times, 12 
January, 1995, p. A24; 'The Future of Peace-Keeping", The Washington Post, 8 January, 1995, p. C6. 
4For this view see John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restored Hope, Washington, 
DC, United States Institute of Peace, 1995; Walter S. Clarke, 'Testing the World's Resolve in Somalia," Parameters, 
Vol XXIII, #4, Winter 1993-94; and Colonel Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, Washington, 
DC, National Defense University Press, 1995. 
of prestige and self-confidence over the outcome, and that their intended target, 
the 'Warlord" Aideed, is now more powerful than ever.5 
Because this unprecedented effort of post-cold war intervention in 
domestic conflict turned out as it did, it is important to learn from both the 
successes and failures.6 The current administration has completed an analysis 
of U.S. participation in United Nations Chapter VI and VII interventions and 
established new priorities and procedures as laid out in Presidential Decision 
Directive 25.7 There is also little doubt that this analysis and subsequent 
change of policy was inspired partly by the problems experienced in Somalia. 
Examining the evolution of U.S. policy in Somalia is important because 
of the difficulty that traditional state systems have when attempting to apply 
traditional military and political strategies to non-state actors. The Somalia 
case offers an opportunity to look at the diplomatic and military solutions 
attempted by the U.N. and the U.S. through several different lenses. The lens 
applied in this study may shed light on the problems experienced with the 
increasing numbers of failed and collapsing states. 
What were the goals of the United States and the United Nations in 
Somalia? What were the strategies and how were they implemented? What 
6Smith Hempstone, "Avoiding Future Somalias," VFW Magazine, February, 1994, p. 30. 
6Colonel Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, Washington, DC, National Defense University 
Press, 1995, p.xvii. 
"'Department of Defense Memorandum for Correspondents on Peace Operations Directive," May 5,1994. This 
document lays out the high points of the classified Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), which outlines 
U.S. policy on participating and reforming multi-lateral peace operations. The document was released to the press 
with comments by Secretary of Defense Perry and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Shalikashvili. 
were the limitations that were inherent to these operations and were they 
recognized? These are some of the important questions about the U.S. role in 
Somalia. The United States (while supporting the United Nations objectives 
implicitly in some cases and explicitly in others) embarked on what amounted 
to a strategy of coercive diplomacy in order to recreate the Somali state. The 
coercive diplomacy strategy was directed at the various faction leaders in 
Somalia but was especially targeted toward the leader of the Somali National 
Alliance (SNA), Muhammad Farrah Aideed. The failure of this strategy during 
UNOSOM II eventually led the U.S. and the U.N. into open warfare against 
militia members loyal to Aideed.8 
This thesis will argue that conditions for successful the use of coercive 
diplomacy existed or were created in Somalia during the United Task Force 
(UNITAF) phase of operations in Somalia. Additionally, it will demonstrate 
how the conditions that existed during the U.S. humanitarian mission of 
UNITAF, quickly evaporated when the U.S. supported the much more difficult 
goals established by United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II).9 
8James L. Woods, "U.S. Government Decision-Making Processes During Humanitarian Operations In Somalia", 
Paper presented at Princeton University conference entitled "Learning from Operation Restore Hope: Somalia 
Revisited", April 21-22,1995, p. 19. James Woods served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African 
Affairs from December 1986 to April 1994. In that position he served as Chairman of the OSD Somalia Task Force 
and as a member of various interagency groups organized to deal with the U.S. involvement in Somalia. Woods 
(among many others) points out that the violent combat operations that erupted after the 5 June ambush, was the 
turning point for the intervention. With the passing of resolution 837, the U.N. was for all intents and purposes 
at war. 
*The U.S. led humanitarian effort in December, 1992 is generally thought of as successful. The U.S. mission 
established objectives of stopping the starvation of thousands of Somali people. The U.S. turned the mission over 
to the United Nations (UNOSOM) in May of 1993 but left U.S. forces to provide a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and 
logistics troops. Some critics of the UNITAF mission such as Walter Clarke, believe that UNITAF did not 
accomplish enough to ensure UNOSOM II could succeed. 
The inherent difficulties of using coercion to achieve diplomatic goals are 
pointed out by Alexander George in the 1971 book, The Limits of Coercive 
Diplomacy.10 This thesis analyzes U.S. policy in Somalia using a modification 
of the original George pre-conditions for success to show why the U.S. and the 
U.N. failed in its attempt to recreate the Somali state. 
'"Alexander George, David K. Hall & William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, Boston, Little, 
Brown and Company, 1971, pp. 211-252. 
H.   A COERCIVE DIPLOMACY STRATEGY 
Coercive diplomacy is generally intended to "back a demand on an 
adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that will be credible 
and potent enough to persuade him that it is in his interest to comply with the 
demand".11 George further defines the strategy as defensive rather than 
offensive, though it may encompass the use of exemplary military force in order 
to show an adversary your willingness to use force if necessary. This 
exemplary force "must be used to strengthen diplomatic efforts at persuasion, 
it is employed in...the form of a quite limited military action, to demonstrate 
resolution and willingness to escalate to high levels of military action if 
necessary."12 
Coercive diplomacy can be an attractive strategy to policy makers 
because it theoretically offers the country a chance to achieve aims with less 
cost in blood and treasure than a more conventional military approach. 
Therefore, if force is used at all, it is not part of a conventional military strategy 
that seeks to destroy the enemy's military forces or their support base. Force 
must be a component of a more complex political-diplomatic strategy for 
resolving a conflict of interests, which is why coercive diplomacy is an 
appropriate description. "Coercive diplomacy seeks to make force a much more 
"Alexander A. George & William E. Simons, (ed.), The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, Second Edition, Boulder, 
Westview Press, Inc., 1994, p. 2. 
12George & Simons, p. 2. 
flexible, refined psychological instrument of policy in contrast to the "quick, 
decisive" military strategy, which uses force as a blunt instrument."13 
Alexander George identifies two types (A & B) or uses for coercive 
diplomacy and differentiates them from deterrence.14 
DETERRENCE:      Persuade opponent not to initiate an action 
COERCIVE DIPLOMACY 
Type A Type B 
persuade opponent to persuade opponent 
stop short of goal to undo his action 
George also argues that diplomacy becomes progressively more difficult 
in terms of pressure on an aggressor necessary to achieve the desired effect as 
you move from a deterrence strategy through Type A to a Type B coercive 
diplomacy strategy.15 The reasons for this are obvious, "the more ambitious the 
demand on the opponent, the more difficult the task of coercive diplomacy 
becomes."16 
U.S. diplomatic efforts after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 offers 
an example of both Type A and B coercive diplomacy. Assuming that Saddam 
Hussein intended to continue his attack into Saudi Arabia, the U.S. successfully 
13George & Simons, pp. 9-11. 




 Ibid, p. 8. 
used Type A coercive diplomacy to persuade him to stop short of that goal. The 
subsequent use of Type B coercive diplomacy to force Iraq from Kuwait was 
unsuccessful and led to what we now call the Persian Gulf War. 
A.       PRE-CONDmONS FOR SUCCESS 
George identified eight pre-conditions that must be present for coercive 
diplomacy to have a strong likelihood of success.17 Those are: 
1. Strength of United States motivation 
2. Asymmetry of motivation favoring the United States 
3. Clarity of American Objectives 
4. Sense of urgency to achieve the American objective 
5. Adequate domestic political support 
6. Usable military options 
7. Opponent's fear of unacceptable escalation 
8. Clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement 
Bruce Jentleson, in the second edition of The Limits of Coercive 
Diplomacy, identified a third type or use for coercive diplomacy; induce a 
change in the composition of the adversary's government. He further theorizes 
that this objective is even more difficult than the objective underlying George's 
Type B. Jentleson used a modified form of the original eight pre-conditions to 
'George, Hall & Simons, p. 216. 
analyze U.S. policy toward Nicaragua during the Reagan administration.    His 
framework is included: 
1. Usable Military Options 
2. A favorable asymmetry of Motivation 
3. A basis for diplomacy 
4. International Legitimacy 
5. Adequate Domestic Support 
Jentleson's essay on Nicaragua inspired the premise for this thesis and 
for that reason it is mentioned here. 
Because of the post-Cold War phenomenon of many rapidly failing and 
break-away states, decision makers may have a new use for the strategy of 
coercive diplomacy. The United Nations fully supported (and sometimes 
directed) by the United States, demonstrated a Type D variant of coercive 
diplomacy, in which the objective was to recreate a government where one no 
longer existed. The methodology for this study is another modified version of 
George's original pre-conditions and is shown with respect to how they apply 
to his original pre-conditions: 
1. Usable Military Options (#6) 
2. Asymmetry of Motivation favoring the United States (#1 & #2) 
18Bruce Jentleson, 'The Reagan Administration Versus Nicaragua: 'The Limits of 'Type C" Coercive Diplomacy," 
in Alexander George & William E. Simons (ed.), The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, Second Edition, Boulder, 
Westview Press, Inc., 1994, p. 176. 
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3. A basis for diplomacy (#7 & #8) 
4. Clarity of American Objective (#3 & #4) 
5. Adequate Domestic Support (#5) 
As shown, I have merged some of George's pre-conditions for simplicity. 
By analyzing these pre-conditions with respect to Somalia, this study will 
explain why the United States did not succeed in recreating the Somali state 
using a coercive diplomacy strategy. 
B.       DEFINITIONS 
In order to understand the Somali political climate in the post-state 
period it is important to briefly discuss the role of clans, factions, militias, and 
power. These elements were important to the decision making processes of the 
United Nations, United States and Somali leaders. 
The line between factions and clans became blurred in Somalia. Suffice 
it to say that factions were clan based. That is, the members of factions were 
of the same clan, but not all clan members were in a single faction.19 For the 
purposes of this study, a faction or militia can be defined as a military/political 
group headed by what most western politicians and media delighted in calling 
"warlords." These "warlords" were essentially former military commanders that 
either fought for or against the Siad Barre regime during the civil war in 1991. 
More importantly, the "warlords" controlled power, especially in Mogadishu. 
19Keith Richburg, "Relations With the Warlords and Disarmament," Paper presented at Princeton University 
conference entitled "Learning from Operation Restore Hope: Somalia Revisited," April 21-22, 1995, p. 2. 
Power in Mogadishu prior to the U.S. humanitarian intervention meant control 
of food that entered the country via the ports of Mogadishu. Power after the 
U.S. led intervention was measured in terms of perceptions. Perceptions of the 
extent to which the "warlords" could provide for their faction's well being after 
what the population believed would be the inevitable departure of the U.S. and 
the U.N. 
Because of the complex nature of the situation in Somalia and the 
relative difficulty that the U.S. and the U.N. had with Mogadishu, this paper 
focuses primarily on the capital of Somalia: Mogadishu. Mogadishu is the 20th 
century center of Somali politics, economics, transportation and culture. For 
these reasons it was the most fought over by the rival factions and therefore the 
most troublesome spot for the U.N. and U.S. intervention forces. 
As defined, coercive diplomacy can be very attractive to policy makers 
because of its relative low costs and inherent flexibility. Did the U.S. and U.N. 
choose coercion in order to meet their objective to recreate the Somali state? 
The next chapter answers those questions and asserts that the U.S. was 
primarily responsible for both the goals and strategies during the U.S. and U.N. 
intervention into Somalia. 
10 
ffl. TOWARD A COERCIVE DIPLOMACY STRATEGY 
Before the coercive diplomacy framework can be applied to the Somalia 
case, three things must be established: 
1. The U.S. was de facto in charge of the strategy applied during both 
UNITAF and UNOSOM II. 
2. The U.S. and the U.N. did attempt a coercive diplomacy strategy to 
meet their objective. 
3. The U.S. and the U.N. did attempt to recreate the Somali state. 
A       THE U.S. AS POLICY-MAKER IN SOMALIA 
When the media-induced public cry for humanitarian relief in Somalia 
reached a crescendo in November 1992, President Bush announced plans to 
relieve the starving population and to have the troops home by President-elect 
Clinton's inauguration day. From that moment on there was little doubt within 
the confines of the Washington inner circle about who was in charge of the 
operation. The U.S. was deeply involved in the wording of U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 794 which authorized the U.S. deployment to "create a 
secure environment."20 U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) carefully 
crafted their mission statement so as not to become involved in so called 
"nation-building."  The subsequent US-led UNITAF deployment placed some 
"Walter Clarke, "Uncertain Mandates in Somalia," Draft Paper presented at Princeton University conference 
entitled "Learning from Operation Restore Hope: Somalia Revisited", April 21-22, 1995, Appendix-2. 
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38,000 troops on the ground (25,426 U.S.) by January 1992. Former U.S. 
Ambassador to Somalia, Robert Oakley led the diplomatic effort for the U.S. as 
Special Envoy. U.S. forces arrived in Mogadishu in December, 1992 with 
overwhelming force and initially only met "armies" of cameramen on the 
beaches. 
As the mission progressed through December it was heralded as a 
tremendous success for the U.S. and as an important precedent for future 
military interventions to deal with humanitarian disasters.21 The Bush 
administration and U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had 
negotiated for the U.S. to turn over the mission to a UN-led force as soon as the 
situation was acceptable. But there appeared to be a test of wills between 
President Bush and the Secretary General. Bush was adamant that the U.S. 
would not become overtly involved in "nation-building." Walter Clarke asserts 
that Boutros-Ghali believed that the U.S. initial commitment would inevitably 
lead them to embrace his "nation-building" agenda and commit the required 
U.S. forces.22 
In February, the newly inaugurated Clinton administration pressed 
Boutros-Ghali for a re-deployment date sooner rather than later. It was clear 
that the newly elected administration did not want to begin its term with a 
21Jannie Botes, "An Exit Interview with Hank Cohen," CSIS Africa Notes, no. 147, April 1993, p. 7. 
22Walter S. Clarke, 'Testing the World's Resolve in Somalia," Parameters, Vol. XXIII, #4, Winter 1993-1994, p. 
47. Walter Clarke served as the Deputy Director of the United States Liaison Office in Mogadishu from March 
to June 1993. It is important to note that it was during this time frame that most critics of UNOSOM II point to 
as the turning point from humanitarian relief to unsuccessful "nation-building". 
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commitment of such magnitude. Although Boutros-Ghali urged the U.S. to 
delay re-deployment until effective disarmament of the bandits and rival clan 
factions, the U.S. ignored the Secretary General's pleas and pressed ever harder 
for a turnover date. Boutros-Ghali was concerned that the turnover from a very 
capable U.S.-led force to a less capable U.N.-led force would cause 
insurmountable problems and destroy any hope for disarming the factions. 
Boutros-Ghali believed that disarmament of the Somali factions and gangs was 
necessary for reconciliation, and that without disarmament the mission could 
not be achieved.23 
Through further negotiations with Boutros-Ghali, the Clinton 
administration took three Conciliatory actions in an attempt to assuage the 
Secretary General. These actions set the stage for continued U.S. presence and 
virtually ensured that the U.S. would become more embroiled than originally 
planned by the Bush administration. The first of these actions involved the 
appointment of retired U.S. Navy Admiral and former Deputy National Security 
Advisor Jonathan Howe as the U.N. Special Envoy and the U.S. approval of the 
UNOSOMII force commander. According to James Woods, "at the policy level, 
there was little disagreement between the US and the UN on what would be 
required,...The entire operation would be under the watchful gaze of an 
American, retired Admiral (and, more importantly, former Deputy National 
Security Advisor) Jon Howe...The Turkish General in command of UNOSOM 
^Clarke, "Uncertain Mandates," p. 16. 
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n, Cevik Bir, had been selected with the approval of the U.S."24 With their man 
leading the U.N. effort, the Clinton administration was in a position to 
decisively influence the strategy. 
Secondly, although the administration continued to stress to the 
American people a limited mission for U.S. troops, they voted for United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 814 (UNSCR 814). UNSCR 814 was 
passed on 26 March 1993. The resolution authorized the establishment of 
UNOSOM n, the first ever peacekeeping operation under the Chapter VII 
enforcement provision of the U.N. Charter. The resolution called for the 
disarmament of the Somali clans, and explicitly endorsed the objective of 
rehabilitating the political institutions and economy of Somalia. The U.S. fully 
supported this mandate.25 
Meanwhile the Clinton administration attempted to spotlight the 
shrinking U.S. involvement by President Clinton personally welcoming the 
returning U.S. Marines from the UNITAF phase of the operation. But the U.S. 
had succumbed to the U.N. insistence that security and logistics operations 
could not be maintained in Mogadishu without help from the U.S. The U.S. left 
behind approximately 4,500 troops of which 1,500 made up the UNOSOM II 
Quick Reaction Force (QRF) while the remainder supplied logistics to the U.N. 
forces. This third concession to Boutros-Ghali made it mandatory that the U.S. 
24Woods, p. 17. 
"Allard, p. 18. 
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stay involved in policy, strategic and tactical planning. These forces would 
eventually become more and more involved in combat operations. Although 
their operations were not under the control of a UN commander as some critics 
have stated, they certainly embarked on more than the original mission of 
acting in response to emergency situations. With President Clinton's pre- 
election emphasis on multi-lateral intervention, the Somalia case provided the 
perfect opportunity to experiment with this seemingly new military option. The 
administration then quietly went about its business, hoping for the best without 
fully considering the military implications of the expanded mandate. 
Indeed, at least one author familiar with the Somali case believes that 
U.S. high level decision making created many of the problems experienced by 
UNOSOM n. "In the end, though, unilateral American action in the guise of 
multilateral U.N. action only plunged the United Nations's esteem lower."26 
Even though Admiral Howe was acting in the capacity of a United 
Nations Special Envoy, there is little doubt that his orders were received 
directly from Washington. Howe points this out himself by stressing that 
military options for the UN were severely hampered by the U.S. insistence on 
approving military operations at the highest levels. He blames this for part of 
the failure to respond quickly to Aideed.27 
26
 Jonathan Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu, Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 
1995, p. 139. 
"Jonathan T. Howe, "Relations Between the United States and the United Nations," Paper presented at 
Princeton University conference entitled "Learning from Operation Restore Hope:Somalia Revisited", April 21-22, 
1995, pp. 4-23. On critics of U.N. policy within the Clinton administration Admiral Howe points out; 'The nations 
are an integral part of the UN. When they criticize the UN for various actions, they often are, in effect, engaging 
in self-criticism. This is especially true of a country as influential as the United States." 
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On at least one occasion President Clinton went so far as to deny 
knowledge about the U.S. attempts to capture Aideed.28 On the other hand, at 
a luncheon for journalists on July 2, 1993 the president told his guests that 
Aideed would "continue to cause problems until and unless we arrest him."29 
This uncertainty has raised doubts about whether President Clinton was 
involved in the decision to go after Aideed with Task Force Ranger. Elizabeth 
Drew points out that eventually President Clinton believed the hunt for Aideed 
was causing even more problems for UNOSOM II and believed that a more 
conciliatory approach should be undertaken. However, Drew maintains that no 
orders from the executive branch were issued to stop the hunt. Drew attributes 
this to confusion among the president's advisors and the Pentagon. 
Why weren't the commanders in the field given new instructions? 
The answer was shrouded in ambiguity, if not outright confusion. 
Following the raid (03-04 October, 1993), and for a long time after 
that, Clinton angrily said to his aides that he thought such 
exercises had been terminated. But others-in their post facto 
explanations-said that no such decision [to terminate] had been 
made...The theory, according to [Anthony] Lake, was that the 
military and diplomatic pressure were complementary. 'The policy 
was never to stop trying to get Aideed,' Lake said. [Secretary of 
Defense] Aspin said afterward, 'The Pentagon's understanding of 
^'U.S. Military Operations In Somalia," Hearings Before the Committee On Armed Services, United States 
Senate, 103rd Congress, Second Session, 12, 21 May, 1994, S. HRG. 103-846, Washington.D.C, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1994, p. 71. In testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, LTC (R) Larry Joyce 
(father of slain Ranger SGT Joyce) testified that he asked President Clinton "...if he (President Clinton) had already 
decided, in September, to seek a diplomatic solution with Aideed, why were the Rangers ordered on October 3 to 
conduct a raid that, by its very nature, would be the most dangerous mission yet?" LTC (R) Joyce further stated 
that President Clinton said "He (President Clinton) told me that was the key question and that he was as dismayed 
as I was that the raid had been launched. He said that when the reports began coming in on October 3, he asked 
his advisers, Why did they do that?'" 
Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 243. 
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the policy was to move to more diplomatic efforts but snatch 
Aideed on the side, if you can.'30 
This has become known as the "two-track strategy" and will be discussed 
in further detail in Chapter IV. Although confusing policies emanated from 
Washington, one thing was clear, the U.S. was calling the shots during both 
UNITAF and UNSOSOM II. 
B.       RECREATING THE SOMALI STATE BY COERCIVE DIPLOMACY 
Did the U.S. embark on a strategy of coercive diplomacy in Somalia? 
Yes, but its coercive character may not have been fully understood. Coercive 
diplomacy is defined as a defensive strategy and only one of a number of tools 
that policy makers have available to achieve foreign policy goals.31 In the 
particular situation in Somalia there were several policy options open for the 
U.S. and the U.N. Invoking Chapter VI and then later Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter were forms of coercive diplomacy as differentiated from 
attempting offensive action against the factions in order to destroy their will to 
resist or to kill and capture their combatants. The limited military actions by 
the U.S. during UNITAF and initially in UNOSOM II reflect the coercive 
diplomacy concept established by George and then later Jentleson; "Costs are 
to be inflicted on the adversary, but these should be of a type and magnitude 
geared more toward influencing his decision than to physically imposing one's 
30
 Ibid, pp. 323-324. 
31George & Simons, pp. 7-10. 
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will upon him."32 Offensive action of the type that would force compliance on 
the people and militia leaders of Somalia would be tantamount to the creation 
of a U.N. protectorate. The recreation of the state would then be a military 
exercise in occupation with all the requisite functions of protectorship to 
include disarming of the militias.33 
U.S. Special Envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Robert Oakley, makes it 
perfectly clear that the use of coercive diplomacy allowed him to induce 
compliance among the various faction leaders. In early December 1992 (prior 
to UNITAF forces arrival), Ambassador Oakley met with the two most powerful 
Somali faction leaders, Mohammed Farrah Aideed and Ali Mahdi, to enlist their 
cooperation in assuring the arrival of U.S. forces went unchallenged.34 From 
the outset, Oakley made it clear that their cooperation was mandatory. "I asked 
both leaders to meet with General Johnston, Ambassador Ismat Kittani (the 
Special Representative of the Secretary General), and me on December 11 at 
the U.S. Liaison Office to discuss the potentially disastrous results if their 
followers unintentionally clashed with U.S. forces. I reminded them of the 
massive firepower that had been used so effectively during Desert Storm."35 
When I asked Ambassador Oakley how he got Aideed to the first meetings with 
32Jentleson, pp. 176. 
33
 Stevenson, pp. 125-128. Stevenson offers a scenario of occupation that includes the disarming of the militias 
using overwhelming military force at the outset coupled with tough diplomatic efforts to induce the militia leaders 
to capitulate. 
34Oakley, Robert B., "An Envoy's Perspective," Joint Forces Quarterly Forum, Autumn 1993, p. 46. 
35Oakley, "An Envoy's Perspective," p 46. 
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Ali Mahdi and later meetings in Addis Ababa, he replied "I twisted his arm,"36 
but didn't elaborate further. Ambassador Oakley further stated that "As far as 
possible, our purpose would be achieved by dialogue and co-option, using 
implicit threats of coercion to buttress requests for cooperation among the 
factions and with UNITAF....Once the Somali leaders concluded an 
agreement...if no action was taken after a decent interval,..they (the leaders) 
should be ready to have UNITAF impose it on them, by force if necessary."37 
The supposed UN-led UNOSOM II operation by its very mandate was 
coercive as well. UNOSOM II was launched under the authority of Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, by UN Security Council Resolution 814.38 Although the 
resolution called for the general disarmament of Somali factions, UNOSOM n, 
by their own admission lacked the military forces and talent to carry out this 
broad military objective.39 Because of this lack of military might, the UNOSOM 
II leadership initially opted for the less inflammatory option of coercive 
diplomacy. 
Admiral Howe paid a well-publicized call on Aideed on May 24 in the 
hopes of getting him to reach a last-minute accommodation for the conference. 
Aideed may have seen this as an act of UNOSOM weakness. It is evident in 
interview with Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, 20 March 1995 at the National Defense University, Washington, 
D.C. 
37Oakley, "An Envoy's Perspective," p. 47. 
^Allard, p. 19. 
''Howe, pp. 8-14. 
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retrospect that whatever limited compulsion he felt to cooperate up to that 
point, was now gone. By showing that he could dupe the UN, Aideed gained 
more support from within his own clan and support from other clans by 
portraying the UN as imperialist.40 In that short time, Howe and UNOSOM II 
had lost the credibility to offer either a stick or a carrot to Aideed. 
The U.N.'s loss of credibility was confirmed on June 5, 1993 when 
Pakistani forces were ambushed by Somali militia after searching a weapons 
cache. The subsequent battle caused the death of 24 Pakistanis and an 
unknown number of Somali militia and innocent bystanders. After June 5, the 
U.N. and U.S. entered a new phase of involvement in Somalia. No longer was 
coercive diplomacy considered an option. When Security Council Resolution 
837 was signed the next day (June 6), the U.N. and the U.S. were at war with 
Aideed's faction. 
The impact of the attack on the Pakistani forces can not be overstated. 
According to a report issued by a U.N. Commission of Inquiry, the events of 
June 5th plunged UNOSOM n into a peace enforcement role rather than a 
peacekeeping one.41 
The events leading to the attack were precipitated by UNOSOM II 
policies that called for the inspection of authorized weapons storage sites 
40Ibid, p. 53. 
41
 Report of the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885 1993 to 
Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel Which Led To Casualties Among Them, United Nations, New 
York, 24 February, 1994, p. 8. This report is the essential source for understanding the implications of the attack 
on the Pakistanis. According to Walter Clarke, the conclusions of this report were initially not published due to 
its criticism of U.N. and U.S. leadership. 
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(AWSS) controlled by the various militias. These weapons sites had been 
established by the UNITAF leadership for the purpose of ridding the 
countryside of crew-served weapons and vehicles. Additionally, General Aideed 
controlled a propaganda radio station known as Radio Mogadishu (also known 
as Radio MOG or Radio Aideed) that was co-located with AWSS #5. Aideed 
used Radio MOG for propaganda against the policies of UNOSOM II and the 
U.S. that conflicted with his vision for Somalia. 
In mid-May, the Pakistanis were asked to submit plans on how Radio 
MOG could be stopped or controlled if the anti-UNOSOM II propaganda 
continued. A decision was made by UNOSOM II to inspect the site during 
routine inspection of the AWSSs. In the meantime, Aideed became aware of 
the discussions to shut down the radio. The above-mentioned report points out 
that Aideed and his followers in the Somalia National Alliance (SNA) "likened 
this approach to 'trusteeship' or 'colonization'".42 
Due to the risk involved in inspecting this particular site, the Pakistanis 
requested that the SNA either be notified ahead of time and wait for then- 
response prior to entry, or conduct the inspection without notice. The 
inspection notice was delivered by Lt Colonel McGovern (UNSOSOM Deputy 
Chief of Intelligence) at approximately 1700 hours on June 4 to General 
Aideed's residence in Mogadishu. The notice was acknowledged by a member 
of Aideed's security, who commented that "the SNA needed time to respond and 
42
 Ibid, p. 15. 
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that if UNOSOM insisted on conducting the inspections as planned that would 
lead to a war."43 
The U.N. inquiry report further states that: 
After delivering the letter, Lt Colonel Mcgovern recorded the 
USC/SNA's objections to the inspection in a memorandum which 
was signed by Colonel Giuseppe Pirotti, the UNOSOM Chief of 
Intelligence. The memorandum was delivered by Lt Colonel 
McGovern to Major-General Thomas Montgomery, Deputy 
UNOSOM Force Commander and Commander of United States 
Joint Task Force (JTF). At the time, Maj.-General Montgomery 
was acting Force Commander in the absence of General Bir who 
was on leave.44 
On the morning of June 5, the Pakistani inspectors arrived 
simultaneously at five different AWSS in Southern Mogadishu. At AWSS #5, 
where Radio MOG was located, a crowd gathered as the Pakistanis inspected 
the site. Several Somali men were inciting the crowd against the inspectors 
and one man was shot when he attempted to grab a rifle from a Pakistani 
soldier. The inspection force at AWSS #5 was able to complete the inspection 
without further violence. Just as it withdrew, however, violence broke out 
when Pakistani forces were attacked at a nearby feeding point. This sparked 
a series of additional attacks aimed at traffic control points manned by 
Pakistanis, and ambushes on Pakistani forces moving toward the initial attacks. 
In all, twenty-four Pakistanis were killed, 57 injured, 6 captured,   all whom 
Ibid, pp. 16-17. 
Ibid, p. 17. 
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were released the next day except for one who died in captivity. Additionally, 
one Italian and three U.S. soldiers were injured.45 
The United Nations Security Council reacted swiftly, passing Resolution 
837 that authorized punitive actions against those responsible for the attacks. 
'Without investigation, blame for the attacks of 5 June was laid on the 
USC/SNA."46 
As significant as the attack was, Walter Clarke argues that the turning 
point of the operation that led to open conflict with Aideed was not the "5 June 
massacre" but a deliberate duping of the UN leadership by Aideed. On 13 May 
1993, Aideed sent a letter to the UNOSOMII Headquarters requesting support 
for a conference to settle disputes between Aideed's Habr Gedir clan, dominant 
in the south central zones of Somalia, and the Mijertain clan, which controlled 
substantial parts of the northeast region of the country. As Clarke points out, 
this was attractive to the relatively inexperienced UNOSOM II leadership 
because it was a good sign that the "warlords" were recognizing the U.N.'s 
authority and role in the reconstruction of the Somali state. But within a week, 
Aideed began quarreling with UNOSOM II officials over the rules of the 
conference. The UNOSOM II conference never got underway. Aideed's 
supporters actually stole the tables and chairs from the proposed location and 
he sponsored his own conference that moved from place to place ostensibly to 
45
 Ibid, pp. 17-18. 
46
 Ibid, p. 19. 
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keep the UNOSOM II facilitator out of the process. Aideed's conference 
concluded on June 4, the day prior to the Somali attack on the Pakistani 
peacekeepers.47 
Admiral Howe's actions after UNSCR 837 were to immediately issue a 
$25,000 reward for Aideed's arrest and to begin his requests for a U.S. team to 
capture the "warlord". UNOSOM II leadership and the U.S. chose a military 
solution at this point and would not attempt a political solution again until after 
the 03 October battle. Essentially there was no carrot offered to Aideed and 
without a carrot you do not have a coercive diplomacy strategy. 
1.        Recreating the State 
Are these examples of coercive diplomacy? Yes, but were they used in 
an attempt to recreate the Somali state? Once again, the answer is yes with 
some qualification for the UNITAF phase of the operation. Formally, the 
mandate for fostering national reconciliation in Somalia was given to UNOSOM 
n in UN Security Council Resolution 814 on 26 March, 1993 which authorized 
UNOSOM II, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, "to assist the people of 
Somalia to promote and advance political reconciliation, through broad 
participation by all sectors of Somali society, and the reestablishment of 
national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire 
country...and to create conditions under which Somali civil society may have 
"Clarke, 'Testing the World's Resolve,"pp. 50-53. 
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a role, at every level, in the process of political reconciliation...."48 From this 
moment on, there could be no doubt as to the objectives of the UNOSOM II 
leadership. Even though in July 1993 the Clinton administration continued to 
downplay U.S. involvement in the reconstruction efforts in Somalia, the U.S. 
Ambassador to the UN, Madeline Albright stated that the U.S. was "prepared 
to stay the course....We believe that the mission of feeding the people and 
restoring Somalia is a very important one."49 She added, "We do all believe that 
it is important to capture Aideed, but what is most important is to be able to get 
back to restoring the law and order and building what is really a failed state."50 
UNOSOM II's objectives were obviously based upon the UN Security 
Council Resolution mandates, but did the earlier and less inspired UNITAF 
mission attempt to recreate the Somali state? It definitely took some important 
first steps toward political reconciliation.51 Ambassador Robert Oakley wasted 
little time in beginning a process of reconciliation with the various faction 
leaders prior to the U.S. troop arrival. Although he has defended his actions 
as necessary for the security of U.S. forces, Washington Post columnist Keith 
Richburg contends that Oakley's actions in December, 1993 were evidence of 
«Hirsch & Oakley, pp. 199-201. 
■"•Madeline Albright, "Interview with CNN correspondent Judy Woodruff," CNN Transcripts, 15 July, 1993. 
50Ibid. 
5IWoods, p. 155. 
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the first indications of "mission creep".52 Indeed, Oakley's long time friend and 
co-worker in Somalia, John Hirsch, points that out, "Oakley and Lieutenant 
General Robert Johnston, with encouragement from Washington and 
CENTCOM, also sawthe international presence as an unofficial umbrella under 
which Somalis could perhaps begin to sort out their political future after 
twenty-one years under Siad Barre's rule...."53 
American political officers working for Oakley organized meetings in the 
various Somali towns to prepare the people for arrival of the U.S. troops. 
These meetings became important sessions for local organization planning to 
start local councils. As pointed out earlier, Oakley "twisted the arms" of Aideed 
and Ali Mahdi to ensure their presence at the Addis Ababa conferences. Jeffrey 
Clark asserts that the political conferences in Addis Ababa in late January and 
again in March 1993 are evidence that the U.S. was involved in a state 
reconciliation process. Additionally, he points out that the U.S. avoided direct 
participation in the Addis Ababa conferences as not to establish expectations 
for an official American role in the political restructuring of Somalia, despite 
the major de facto role in just such a process.54 
S2Keith B. Richburg, "Broader U.S. Role Developing in Somalia," The Washington Post, December 31, 1992, p. 
1/16. Richburg provided the most comprehensive, cogent and timely media coverage of the U.S. intervention in 
Somalia. He contended in December 1992 that the U.S. operation was already expanded beyond the mission of 
opening relief corridors and moving food to starving people. 
53Hirsch & Oakley, p. xviii. 
"Jeffrey Clark, "Debacle in Somalia: Failure of the Collective Response," in Lori Damrosch (ed.), Enforcing 
Restraint, New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, pp. 230-231. 
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Even though Bush administration officials continued to present the 
intervention as a solely humanitarian effort, Keith Richburg of the Washington 
Post quotes senior U.S. officials in December of 1992 as admitting this was only 
a political ploy. "Clearly you can't just come here and deliver some food and 
leave,"55 said one U.S. official in Somalia. As much as the UNITAF leadership 
tried not to have their strategy labeled "nation-building", the situation in 
Somalia made it obvious that merely feeding the hungry, would not suffice to 
end the situation of starvation in Somalia. 
Oakley and Lieutenant General Johnston (UNITAF Commander) may 
have realized that feeding the hungry without some political settlement among 
the factions was merely applying a band-aid to a festering sore. Without a 
modicum of political reconciliation and some semblance of the re-creation of 
infrastructure, the starvation would resume when the military troops that forced 
compliance left. Although not meant as an endorsement for U.S. "nation- 
building", U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, Smith Hempstone pointed this out in a 
now infamous memorandum. 
In July 1992 Ambassador Hempstone sent a memorandum to the Under 
Secretary of State Frank Wisner after receiving a request for his input on the 
emerging situation in Somalia. In addition to his uncanny prediction of the 
Somali people's reaction and the military/political disaster for the U.S., his 
questions about what the U.S. was willing to sacrifice reflected a shrewd 
i5Richburg, p. 1/16. 
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understanding of not only the American culture, but of the Somali's as well. 
Commenting on U.S. plans for intervention, he wrote: 
To what end? To keep tens of thousands of Somali kids from 
starving to death in 1993 who, in all probability, will starve to 
death in 1994 (unless we are prepared to remain through 1994)? 
Just how long are we prepared to remain in Somalia, and what are 
we prepared to do: Provide food, guard and distribute food, hunt 
guerrillas, establish a judicial system, form a police force, create 
an army, encourage the formation of political parties, hold free 
and fair multi-party elections?56 
As it turned out, those things are exactly what the U.S. and the U.N. 
attempted to do. Other than feeding the Somali population and the guerrillas 
that the U.S. would later have to fight, none of these tasks were carried out 
efficiently. 
Apparently, the political and state restructuring efforts of UNITAF were 
quite obvious to those individuals tasked with carrying them out. Walter S. 
Clarke states that, "One of the arguments made by critics was that somehow the 
original humanitarian focus of the intervention had been diverted to "nation- 
building." Complaints about a change in the mission are unjustified. By its 
very nature, Operation Restore Hope was always more than simple 
humanitarian operations...it was clear that the successes of UNITAF would be 
judged not by how many people it helped to feed, but by the political situation 
it left behind."57 
66Staff, 'Think Three Times Before You Embrace the Somali Tarbaby," U.S. News & World Report, Vol.113, No. 
23, December 13, 1992, p. 30. 
"Walter Clarke, 'Testing the World's Resolve," p. 42. 
28 
Indeed, it appears that most everyone agreed on the principle that long- 
term progress could not be achieved without political reconciliation. The U.S., 
however, did not want the responsibility that this long term solution implied. 
Ambassador Oakley argues that his diplomatic actions were simply carried out 
to ensure military expediency in achieving the humanitarian goals.58 Indeed, 
as will be pointed out later in Chapter IV, Oakley was quite successful using 
coercive diplomacy to achieve compliance among the various militia leaders. 
His subtle ability to not getting tied down to a state restructuring agenda while 
establishing some of the pre-conditions for Somali state restructuring efforts is 
noteworthy. 
Regardless of his intent, the political processes begun in UNITAF would 
have repercussions for UNOSOM II in that the "warlords" were accustomed to 
co-option by the U.S. leadership. Although the political processes begun by 
Oakley were not intended to force the re-creation of the Somali state on U.S. 
terms, the ease with which Oakley managed the militia leaders may have lulled 
the UNOSOM II leadership into thinking their expanded mandate would be just 
as easy. They were sadly mistaken. 
68




A.       USABLE MILITARY OPTIONS 
Bruce Jentleson points out that, "The key military requisite of coercive 
diplomacy is that if force is used, it must be wielded in a 
controlled,discriminating manner....Costs are to be inflicted on the adversary, 
but these should be of a type and magnitude geared more toward influencing 
his decision than to physically imposing one's will upon him."59 
There is a disproportionality between the objective of recreating a state 
and the limits on the military means to be used for the task.60 During the 
UNITAF phase of the operation, the mere presence of decidedly overwhelming 
force in and of itself was normally enough to force the factions into compliance 
with U.N. and particularly Oakley's demands. When force was applied 
"UNITAF forces showed no hesitation in using measured force to destroy 
'technicals' and illegal weapons caches."61 
On 24 January, 1993 forces loyal to General Morgan (one of Aideed's 
rivals for control of Somalia) attacked forces loyal to General Aideed and led 
by Colonel Omar Jess. Jess was guarding his heavy weapons in a UNITAF 
designated AWSS in Kismayo.    The local UNITAF commander, General 
69Bruce W. Jentleson, in Alexander A. George & William E. Simons (ed.), The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 
Second Edition, Boulder, Westview Press, Inc., 1994, p. 176. 
"Ibid, p. 176.   This concept adapted from Jentleson.   He uses the same terminology applied to changing a 
government. 
61Woods, p. 14. Emphasis added. 
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Magruder, attacked Morgan's forces and drove them back. They destroyed a 
number of technicals and artillery pieces but didn't pursue the forces any 
further than necessary to separate the combatants. UNITAF and U.S. Liaison 
Office Somalia (USLO) officials participated in talks with Morgan and became 
convinced that he was reasonable and would not attack Jess' forces again. But 
on the night of 22 February, some of Morgan's troops slipped into Kismayo 
dressed as herders and began attacking houses belonging to senior Jess and 
Aideed supporters. Jess and his militia fled Kismayo and looted Red Cross and 
NGO warehouses that they were paid to protect.62 After this, Oakley says that 
he and Johnston "issued an ultimatum to Morgan to withdraw to Doble at the 
Kenyan border and another to Jess to canton his men and arms at locations 
near Jilib."63 
Although both complied, Oakley contends that reports by British 
Broadcasting Company (BBC) and Reuters led Aideed supporters in Mogadishu 
to believe that Morgan had taken Kismayo with the tacit approval of the 
UNITAF forces. This sparked anti-UNITAF demonstrations in Mogadishu and 
violence erupted in Mogadishu in the form of attacks against Nigerian forces 
and angry demonstrations against the U.S. embassy.64 After two days of 
consultation within UNITAF and the USLO and upon discussions with Aideed, 
Oakley and Zinni sent a private warning to Aideed that: 
^Hirsch & Oakley, pp. 76-77. 




...he would personally be held accountable for any recurrence. 
There were no further anti-UNITAF actions by the SNA.65 
This was a case of successfully using the threat of force to convince Aideed not 
to use violence against UNITAF. 
The U.S. led UNITAF force had very limited objectives. The objective 
was not to quickly recreate the Somali state, but rather to ensure the 
distribution of food, the near termination of violence, and the beginnings of 
political reconciliation. 
In contrast to UNITAF, UNOSOM II attempted to not only ensure the 
survival of the population, but to recreate the Somali state structure. Walter 
Clarke complains that UNITAF did not do enough to disarm and punish the 
"warlords." He asserts that "the UNITAF deployment provided the force 
necessary to impress the warlords but lacked the political objectives to cause 
them to back down."66 
The real problem, however, was not what UNITAF did not do, but rather 
that the U.S. supported the objectives of UNSCR 814 without the requisite 
support to U.S. forces during their participation in UNOSOM II. This became 
painfully obvious when confirmed reports that Secretary of Defense Les Aspirt 
turned down General Montgomery's request for armor in September, 1993 
became a matter of public debate. 
^Ibid, p. 79. The Somali National Alliance (SNA) was created by Aideed after the overthrow of Siad Barre. 
The obvious reference to Somali nationalism is an overstatement at best. As pointed out earlier in the text, the 
militia leaders were able to hold power by means of military force, not specific alliance to individuals. 
^Clarke, "Uncertain Mandates," p. 21. 
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In September 1993, U.S. Forces Commander, Major General Thomas 
Montgomery requested U.S. M-1 tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles due to the 
increased tempo and hazards of combat operations. Although this request was 
supported by Commander in Chief of Central Command, General Hoar and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Powell, Secretary of Defense Aspin 
turned down the request. Aspin later took full responsibility for his decision 
and resigned from his post. The concerns over political perceptions as to the 
U.S. intentions in Somalia obscured the question of providing force protection 
that was requested by the military leaders. 
Admiral Howe points this out in a scathing indictment of the Clinton 
administration's support for its troops; "The US, in effect, seemed to manage 
UN requests unintentionally on the margins, providing enough to keep 
operations going but not enough to ensure success. 
The Clinton administration's fears of sending armored vehicles were 
based on the perception that this would send a wrong impression. It is hard to 
imagine what signal could be worse than the American public finding out that 
soldiers did not have the equipment deemed necessary by their commander in 
the field. Perhaps Secretary Aspin remembered the lessons from Vietnam that 
Armor has no place in a counter-insurgency conflict. 
Edward Luttwak argues that Post-Cold War conflicts focused on quick 
results cause combatants to take risks which inevitably lead to casualties on all 
sides. The new form of warfare and new form of mentality would need to inject 
unheroic realism into military means and require not only a patient disposition, 
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but also a modest one. This disposition would foster objectives that would 
permit partial effects, when doing more would be too costly in U.S. lives and 
doing nothing too damaging to world order and U.S. self-respect.67 Indeed, 
Larry Cable offers that this new strategy be based on presence, patience, and 
persistence, rather than the Vietnam era strategy of find, fix and destroy.68 
The August 1993 deployment of Task Force Ranger is an example of 
such risk taking. Rather than maintaining a large force for a long time, or 
exercising constant and persistent coercive force against Aideed's faction, the 
U.S. attempted to go for the quick, single surgical strike win. The idea of a 
"pristine" environment may have been fostered by the footage of Desert Storm 
bombing footage. But the urban environment of Mogadishu offers no such 
"pristine" place to fight. The vicious fire-fight on October 3-4, 1993 dissolved 
this perception and broke the American political will. Having played the 
politically high risk card, the Clinton administration chose the neo-Vietnam 
option of declaring victory and going home. 
B.       ASYMMETRY OF MOTIVATION 
Alexander George emphasizes that motivation of the actors influences 
the outcome of a coercive diplomacy strategy. "The likelihood of successful 
coercion is greater if one side is more strongly motivated by what is at stake 
•"Edward N. Luttwak, 'Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," Foreign Affairs, #3, Vol. 74, May/June, 1995, pp. 110-122. 
""Larry Cable, Lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 02 February 1995. 
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than its opponent, and, particularly, if its opponent is aware of this."69 During 
UNITAF, the motivation appeared to be equal among both the U.N. and the 
faction leaders. As the more intrusive UNOSOM II phase began, the U.S. and 
the U.N. became disadvantaged, this time by what Jentleson calls an 
"unfavorable asymmetry of motivation" for both the U.S. and the U.N.70 
The U.S. was motivated by two considerations: to succeed in Somalia for 
obvious humanitarian reasons, but there was also another and perhaps more 
important one. In the wake of the Cold War, the U.S. (and certainly Clinton) 
was especially interested in ensuring that the "new world order" could be 
controlled with a hefty dose of multi-lateralism.71 The dream of multi- 
lateralism, however, would soon suffer a substantial blow.72 
For the faction leaders, there was a much more important motivating 
factor: survival. Once the false Somali Cold War economy totally 
disintegrated, the Somali infrastructure collapsed. With scarce resources, the 
traditional clan structures resurfaced to some degree.73 Food became power 
^George, Hall & Simons, p. 219. 
70Jentleson in George & Simons, p. 189. 
71Hirsch & Oakley, p. 151. Oakley believes that Somalia served as an experiment in multi-lateral interventions 
in "failed states." He refers to candidate Clinton's pre-election speeches whereby he touts the concepts of "multi- 
lateralism." See also Thomas G. Weiss, "Overcoming the Somalia Syndrome: Operation Rekindle Hope," Global 
Governance, 1:2 .Spring 1995. 
72
 Jonathan Clark, "Rhetoric Before Reality: Loose Lips Sink Ships," Foreign Affairs, #5, Vol. 74, 
September/October, 1995, p. 2-7. 
73Helen Chapin Metz, (ed.), Somalia: A Country Study, Washington, Library of Congress, 1993, p. 163. Former 
President Siad Barre outlawed clans after coming to power in 1969. The real power in Somalia was controlled 
in Mogadishu where the various forms of aid came through. Although clans were outlawed, structures remained, 
in fact Barre's clan became the most powerful due to his policy of granting high-paying government jobs to his 
clan members. 
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and power was vested in the "warlords".    The "warlords", especially in 
Mogadishu, assumed the helm of their particular faction and were de facto in 
charge of their respective clan or sub-clan. 
Ken Menkhaus points out: 
...the peace process in Somalia was under constant threat from a 
sizable "conflict constituency" which had vested interests in 
continued instability. These interests included and continue to 
include, those who profit from an economy of plunder, mafia-like 
extortion rackets, and various other unlawful economic dealings; 
militia leaders whose power base rests on conquest and fear.74 
1.        Mission Creep And Asymmetry of Motivation 
A by-product of the "mission creep" that occurred in Somalia was an 
asymmetry of motivation that favored the faction leaders over both U.N. and 
U.S leaders. The objectives that UNOSOM II pursued threatened the power 
that the various faction leaders enjoyed. While the risks to the faction leaders 
increased dramatically, thus increasing their motivation, there was not a 
corresponding increase in the motivation of the U.N. and U.S. leaders. 
Walter Clarke believes that the clans offered a system of survival for the 
Somali "warlords". He points out that Aideed's Habr Gedr sub-clan was his 
"center of gravity" and would have him as their leader only as long as he 
protected them  and  ensured they had food.75     With this  atmosphere, 
74Ken Menkhaus, 'The Reconciliation Process in Somalia: A Requiem," Draft Paper presented at Princeton 
University conference entitled "Learning from Operation Restore Hope: Somalia Revisited," April 21-22, 1995, p. 
21. 
75Clarke, 'Testing the World's Resolve," p. 54. 
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maintaining power in the face of U.S. and U.N. intervention became all or 
nothing for Aideed and his faction. 
Oakley's diplomatic strategy to ensure aid arrived where it was needed 
provided an impetus for Aideed and other faction leaders to capitulate. This so 
called "top-down"76 process virtually ensured that the "warlords" would maintain 
their power (at least for a time). UNITAF was able to co-opt Aideed and other 
faction leaders because their power was not threatened to the degree they 
would experience during UNOSOMII. Oakley ensured that the faction leaders 
understood what UNITAF was there to accomplish, "The message was clear- 
you can keep your weapons and your status as militia leaders intact, in 
exchange for allowing our troops to pursue the humanitarian aspects of the 
operation unimpeded."77 This process of diplomacy will be studied further in 
the next section. 
Additionally, the massive food distribution campaign conducted by 
UNITAF and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) had all but stopped 
the necessity for roving bands to steal food for survival. Not that it was not still 
taking place, but the effort at attaining sustenance was no longer a primary 
motivator for the bandits or the "warlords". James Woods sums up this aspect, 
"Suffice it to say that within 90 days UNITAF had accomplished its mandate 
76
 Princeton University conference entitled "Learning from Operation Restore Hope: Somalia Revisited," April 
21-22, 1995. During this conference, the UNITAF approach to reconciliation was generally referred to as a "top- 
down" approach referring to the method of involving the faction leaders who controlled the power, overthe general 
Somali population. The UNOSOM II approach was generally regarded as a different approach from UNITAF. This 
approach relied on a more traditional Somali cultural process of clan council based elders, regional systems and 
women. It should be noted that women did not play a part in traditional clan councils. 
■"Richburg, "Relation With the Warlords," p. 5. 
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and was ready to withdraw. Within that time, the famine in Somalia had been 
brought under control, a measure of tranquility restored, and some important 
first steps taken to start the process of reconciliation."78 
How did the asymmetry of motivation become unfavorable for the U.S.? 
The UNOSOM II leadership took a decidedly different approach in their 
political reconciliation efforts. Their approach has come to be known as the 
"bottom-up" approach.79 UNOSOM II's focus was on recreating the Somali state 
based on district and regional councils. These district and regional councils 
had the effect of reducing Aideed's power and were "a serious institutional 
obstacle to Aideed's long term ambitions."80 
With the increasing pressure UNOSOM II was applying on Aideed, he 
became more, rather than less powerful. A report from Human Rights Watch: 
Africa contends that Aideed intentionally began fighting with U.N. and U.S. 
forces specifically because it increased his following and served to unite many 
Somalis against the U.N.81 Ambassador Oakley suggests that Aideed became 
a martyr, growing more powerful each time the U.S. and U.N. engaged him 
militarily, "Aideed began to take on an almost mythological stature, even among 
Somalis who did not care for or support him, through his appeal to powerful 
"Woods, p. 155. 
^Princeton University conference entitled "Learning from Operation Restore Hope: Somalia Revisited," April 
21-22, 1995. 
""Hirsch & Oakley, p. 135. 
81
 Human Rights Watch: Africa, April, 1995, p. 68. 
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traditional and nationalist identifications."82 He contends that after the U.S. 
began its attacks on Aideed, the SNA became better organized and began 
receiving support from the different clans across Somalia.83 
For Aideed, the conflict had become one of survival in the sense that his 
continued existence depended upon his ability to avoid capture or forced power 
sharing with other Somali leaders. His ability to arouse the spirits of the 
Somalis in Mogadishu against the "neocolonialist" Americans served to create 
a dangerous situation for the U.N. and U.S. forces. 
C.       BASIS FOR DIPLOMACY 
George states .that: 
To employ coercive diplomacy successfully,..., one must find a 
combination of carrot and stick that will suffice to overcome the 
opponent's disinclination to grant what is being asked of him. 84 
The opponent in this case were the faction leaders, above all Aideed. During 
UNOSOM n, he was being asked to relinquish power. The power that he 
possessed, as pointed out earlier, represented survival for Aideed. 
Jentleson points out, "It is hard to imagine what kind of carrot could 
overcome the zero-sum nature of such stakes."85 His reference was to changing 
^Hirsch & Oakley, p. 123. 
•»Ibid. 
MGeorge, Hall & Simons, p. 243. 
^Jentleson in George & Simons, p. 178. 
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an opponent's government, but as advanced in the previous section, power in 
Somalia became the faction leaders primary motivation. 
The combination of carrots and sticks was initially effective during 
UNITAF and totally lost importance immediately prior to and during UNOSOM 
n. What defined the basis of diplomacy during each of these distinct 
operations? 
The basis for diplomacy was not so much a function of the pre-conditions 
as established by their particular mandates. It was more so a function of the 
goals established by the leadership of the individuals placed in charge of 
operations for the U.S. and the U.N. in Somalia. 
Initially, Ambassador Oakley's combination of carrots and sticks allowed 
for the open discourse with the various faction leaders in Somalia. Although 
it is true that there are few carrots in this situation, Oakley appears to have 
understood the significance of the available diplomatic options. The carrots for 
Somalia in general was allowing UNITAF and UNOSOM II to operate freely. 
This would, in theory, return order to civil society and end mass starvation. As 
Ambassador Oakley points out, "The keen Somali interest in international 
material assistance was a significant incentive for at least a degree of 
cooperation."86 Oakley saw the importance that playing to the "warlords" 
prestige would bring to the process during initial talks in December, 1992. He 
states, "As far as possible, the goal would be achieved by dialogue and co- 
^Hirsch & Oakley, p. 57. 
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Option, using the implicit threat of coercion to encourage the faction leaders to 
gain prestige by showing leadership at home and to the international 
community."87 This is a clear indicator that Oakley was maintaining both 
options open. He further states that UNITAF would not "pick a winner,"88 and 
"would try hard not to play favorites."89 Even though Aideed accused UNITAF 
and Oakley of plotting against him after the Kismayo incident in January, 
Oakley was able to maintain a dialogue with Aideed and the other faction 
leaders.90 
As pointed out in the previous section on asymmetry of motivation, the 
militia leaders were able to keep their weapons as long as they did not use 
them against UNITAF or each other. However, UNITAF always maintained the 
stick if any militia forces should get out of line. Keith Richburg points this out, 
"There was of course the explicit threat of the use of force, that attacks on the 
U.S. troops would be responded to massively, and that was demonstrated early 
on in the operation when U.S. helicopters destroyed an Aideed cantonment site 
that was known to house snipers."91 
It should be pointed out that there are many critics of Oakley's strategy 
of negotiating with the "warlords". Many of the leaders of UNOSOM II would 
87Hirsch & Oakley, p. 56. 
•»Hirsch & Oakley, p. 156. 
""Ibid. 
'»Ibid, pp. 155-157. 
9IRichburg, "Relation With the Warlords," p. 5. 
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later criticize Oakley's strategy of negotiation as strengthening the "warlords" 
hand and legitimating their power in the eyes of other Somalis.92 This criticism 
is accurate when viewed from the perspective of the expanded mandates of 
UNOSOM II. But the UNITAF mandate was defined by the narrow mission as 
defined by the Bush administration, that of humanitarian aid. The political 
pressure in Washington to limit U.S. casualties and not conduct "nation- 
building" drove Oakley's actions.93 The bottom line for UNITAF is that Oakley's 
diplomatic tactics appeared to have worked in coercing support or at least 
tolerance from Aideed. 
Oakley would not play a personal role in the Addis Ababa conference in 
March; it is apparent, though, that he encouraged if not coerced Aideed and the 
other faction leaders to participate. "The U.S. avoided direct participation in 
the Addis Ababa conference so as not to establish expectations for an official 
American role in the political restructuring of Somalia, despite the major de 
facto role in just such a process."94 The Addis Ababa Reconciliation Conference 
laid the groundwork for a long-term political solution for Somalia. The 
agreement created a seventy-four-member Transitional National Council (TNC) 
based on regional structures that would eventually lead to  a national 
^Critics include Admiral Howe, Robert Gosende from the United States Liaison Office/Somalia, Keith Richburg 
from the Washington Post, and of course Walter Clarke. Each voiced this criticism at the Princeton Conference 
entitled "Learning from Operation Restore Hope: Somalia Revisited," April 21-22, 1995. 
93Walter S. Clarke, Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia, Carlisle Barracks, Center for Strategic Leadership, 
1995. In this book Clarke has compiled a list of 2000 books and articles. He comments on many of the issues 
brought up by the authors and is critical of UNITAF and Oakley's strategies in this compilation. 
^Clark, pp. 230-231. 
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government. The problem of implementation was left unsolved however. The 
reconciliation agreements that were reached in Addis Ababa, highly touted at 
the time, would never bear fruit. 
James Woods asserts that UNOSOM II strangely ignored the promising 
agreements set forth in Addis Ababa due to the preoccupation with the hunt for 
Aideed after the June 5 attack on the Pakistani forces.95 Ambassador Oakley 
believes that these regional structures were eventually seen by Aideed as 
contrary to his legitimate position of power. After all, Aideed had been one of 
the leaders who had been most responsible for the defeat of the Siad Barre 
regime. The belief that the overthrow of Barre was a populist revolution was 
not lost on Aideed.96 
The Addis Ababa conference may have confirmed to Aideed and his 
faction what they suspected all along; the U.N. (fully supported by the U.S.) 
was attempting to "marginalize their influence, or cut them out of Somalia's 
future political equation by padding the deck, so to speak, with women's 
groups, elders, intellectuals, Moslem clerics and traditional leaders."97 
Because of this, some believe that Aideed may have intentionally 
provoked the U.N. in order to maintain his power base with his clan and 
^Woods, p. 19. 
^Hirsch & Oakley, p. 135. 
^Richburg, "Relation With the Warlords," p. 6. 
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faction.98 Whatever the reason he ordered the attack (if he did), there was soon 
to be a drastic change in the nature of the situation in Mogadishu. 
On 6 June, UN Security Council Resolution 837 was passed. The 
resolution called for the capture of "those responsible" for the Pakistani 
deaths." Ambassador Howe's strategy was to offer a $25,000 reward for 
Aideed's arrest and he began to petition his contacts in Washington for what 
would eventually lead to the deployment of Task Force Ranger in late August.100 
On June 12, UNOSOM II forces led by U.S. AC-130 and Cobra gunships, 
attacked Aideed's weapons compound in downtown Mogadishu. On June 17, 
Aideed's forces killed 5 more U.N. soldiers; on June 27-28, 2 more U.N. troops 
died; on July 3, 3 more; and on July 7, 6 Somali U.N. employees were killed. 
On July 12, the U.N., led by soldiers from the U.S. 10th Mountain Division 
attacked Aideed's main compound.101 No longer could these military actions be 
explained as exemplary in nature as required for effective coercive diplomacy. 
"In effect, and regrettably for the operation and for Somalia, UNOSOM and 
Aideed were now at war."102 
It is important to note that Admiral Howe did make a last ditch effort at 
diplomacy with Aideed prior to the June 5 attack (see section on Recreating 
^Human Rights Watch: Africa, p. 68. 
"Hirsch & Oakley, p. 209. 
100Woods, p. 20. 
10,Ibid, p. 19. 
102Ibid. 
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the Somali State by Coercive Diplomacy).   However, it was apparent that 
Aideed felt no compulsion to negotiate with UNOSOM II. 
1.       A Two-track Strategy 
Although I have contended that the June 5 battle between the Pakistanis 
and Somali militiamen ended the period of coercive diplomacy, it is important 
to look briefly at what became a two-track strategy. This strategy on one hand 
attempted to "cajole and assist the UN to energetically fulfill the broad mandate 
of UNOSOM IT103 and on the other to capture Aideed. As pointed out earlier, 
the President himself would express surprise at this strategy and after the 3-4 
October fire-fight said, 'We have no interest in denying anybody access to 
playing a role in Somalia's political future."104 This was a direct signal to 
Aideed that the U.S. was willing to include him in a political solution. However 
the signal came too late to influence Aideed's decision making during the 
critical period after he became the target of U.S. and U.N. forces. Although 
some in the administration embraced the two-track strategy, the President 
believed that diplomacy based on a political rather than military solution was 
being advanced.105 
Ambassador Oakley was sent back to Somalia after the October 3-4 
battle, where he found himself attempting to alter the dynamics of the 
l03Ibid, p. 20. 
""Thomas L. Friedman, "Somalia offers a Lesson for U.S,., The New York Times, 10 October, 1993, 5c. 
105
 Drew, p. 325. 
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diplomatic situation back to where it was in March. As Oakley observed, the 
formula on regional councils decided upon by the Addis Ababa accords of 
March 1993, "was no longer regarded as inevitable."106 Had the decision makers 
taken this stance earlier in the process, the deaths of American servicemen in 
late summer and fall of 1993 may have not occurred. Instead, the parents, 
wives, and children of killed American soldiers rebounded in horror as they 
learned of U.S. planes flying Aideed to the latest peace talks.107 
The catalyst for this two-track strategy may have occurred when Aideed 
wrote former President Jimmy Carter for help in averting an impending disaster 
in August of 1993. On 13 September, Carter and President Clinton discussed 
the Somalia situation and the letter. Sidney Blumenthal asserts that Carter 
came away convinced that President Clinton intended to rescind the order to 
capture Aideed.108 Instead, On 22 September, the U.S. fully supported UNSCR 
865, which reaffirmed previous resolutions on Somalia. "By omitting any 
suggestion of a change in the policy of pursuing Aideed, the Security Council 
effectively endorsed its continuation."109 Here was a perfect chance for the 
Clinton administration to de-emphasize the hunt for Aideed and pursue more 
stridently the peace process as set forth in the Addis Ababa accords. But as I 
106Hirsch & Oakley, p. 140. 
""Interview with LTC (Retired) Larry Joyce, 15 January, 1995. LTC Joyce is father of Ranger Sergeant Casey 
Joyce killed in action on 3 October, 1993. 
108Sidney Blumenthal, 'Why Are We in Somalia?," The New Yorker, October 25, 1993, for an account of the 
Carter-Clinton discussion. 
"»Hirsch & Oakley, p. 126. 
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have asserted, the U.S. and U.N. leadership in Somalia was no longer in a 
negotiating mood and had defiantly jerked the carrot from in front of Aideed. 
D.       CLARITY OF AMERICAN AND UN OBJECTIVES 
George states that "Clarity as to the objective, while perhaps not always 
essential, may be necessary in some situations if limited force is to be applied 
effectively on behalf of the strategy of coercive diplomacy."110 How important 
is it to have clear objectives in coercive diplomacy? Almost everyone agrees 
that precise objectives are essential for successful diplomacy. However, most 
everyone also agrees that the objectives are much harder to define. In the 
business of recreating failed states, Colonel Ken Allard offers some advice: 
Clear UN mandates are critical to the planning of the mission 
because they shape the basic political guidance given to U.S. 
forces by our National Command Authorities (NCA). A clear 
mandate shapes not only the mission (the what) that we perform 
but the way we carry it out (the how).111 
One thing is certain about Somalia, the U.N. leadership (i.e., Boutros- 
Ghali) had very clear objectives in mind for Somalia but lacked the political 
power to achieve them during UNITAF and lacked the military power during 
UNOSOMII. Equally certain is that the U.S. began with clear policy objectives 
in UNITAF. However, as the operation moved from the "purely humanitarian" 
mission of UNITAF to the "nation-building" mandates of UNOSOM II, multiple 
""George, Hall & Simons, p. 220. 
'"Allard, p. 22. 
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and shifting policy objectives replaced the former coherent (if not very limited) 
U.S. objectives. 
The real problem initially was not that the U.N. or U.S. had unclear 
objectives. The problem was that their objectives were not synchronized. The 
U.S. objectives for UNITAF reflected the strategy of then Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs, General Colin Powell. The use of overwhelming force to achieve goals 
is the cornerstone of the Powell Doctrine. The U.S. carefully crafted U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 794 to suit their particular form of strategy.112 The 
Theater Commander in Chief (CINQ of U.S. Central Command, in conjunction 
with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the National Command Authority 
crafted the end state for Operation Restore Hope. 
The U.S. Army Field Manual 100-3 (FM 100-3) defines an "end state" as, 
"A set of required conditions which, when achieved, attain the aims set for the 
campaign or operation. The end state describes what the National Command 
Authority (NCA) and the combatant commander want the situation to look like 
when the operations conclude."113 
The end state for Operation Restore Hope was:114 
The end state desired is to create an environment in which the UN 
and the NGOs can assume full responsibility for the security and 
operations of the Somalia humanitarian relief efforts. 
112Clarke, "Uncertain Mandates," p. A-2. 
'"Operation Restore Hope: Lessons Learned Report, 3 December 1992 - 4 May 1993, Leavenworth, Center For 
Army Lessons Learned, May 1993, p. 1-14. 
1,4Ibid. 
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Who would determine the successful accomplishment of the end state? 
The U.S., but the mandate was from the U.N. and it would be the U.N. that had 
to assume the mission. This sticking point was to be the first of many problems 
that would disable the U.N.'s overall strategy. 
It has already been established that Boutros-Ghali wanted the U.S. to 
carry out general disarmament of the Somali population and that both Bush 
and Clinton denied this request. Walter Clarke pointed out what may have 
been wishful thinking on the part of Boutros-Ghali: that the U.S. would 
eventually capitulate to his demands and conduct the disarmament campaign.115 
However, the U.S. was determined that its commitment would be short 
and that they would not get involved in disarming Somali gangs and militia 
members. The rhetoric Bush enunciated at the time also established a limited 
military operation in time and purpose. President-elect Bill Clinton agreed with 
the mission limits and criteria established by the Bush administration and did 
not announce any major policy shifts for U.S. commitments.116 
This fact however did not later deter the Clinton administration from 
fully supporting the mandates as outlined in UNSCR 814 or 837. These 
mandates explicitly called for the recreation of the Somali state, "the US, 
however, did not change its goal of eliminating direct military support as soon 
as feasible."117 As Admiral Howe points out, "UNITAF appeared to measure its 
116Clarke, "Uncertain Mandates," p.16. 
'"Walter S. Clarke, Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia, p. 39. 
"'Howe, p. 8. 
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success by the timeliness of its withdrawal; UNOSOM worried about 
maintaining continuity in the near term and the much broader two year 
commitment ahead."118 
The decision to fully support the expanded mandate without an equally 
expanded commitment of armed forces demonstrates a lack of clarity as to the 
objective. Indeed, just as the U.S. was pulling out its overwhelming force 
contingent of UNITAF, the U.N. was assuming the expanded military mission 
with a much less capable force of ad hoc coalitions. Meanwhile, the Clinton 
administration continued to deny that the U.S. mission had changed. Caught 
in the middle were the soldiers from 10th Mountain Division and the forces 
from the other nations involved. The Quick Reaction Force (QRF) of the 10th 
were initially responsible only for emergency situations in which other U.N. 
forces might find themselves while carrying out U.N.-directed patrols and 
missions. But the real truth was evident when this force became engaged in 
combat operations, by attacking Aideed's compound in July. This use of U.S. 
military forces should have been seen as likely due to the lack of equipment 
and trained military forces from the U.N. contingents. Only the U.S. forces had 
the training and equipment required to substantially influence the balance of 
power in Mogadishu. With the expanded mandate, the U.N. leaders turned to 
their only viable options, the Americans. 
eIbid, p. 11. 
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The U.S. insistence (albeit understandable) that U.S. combat forces not 
fall under U.N. command caused an equally understandable consternation 
among the other coalition members. If the United States would not conduct 
disarmament of the population, why should the Pakistanis or the Egyptians. In 
fact, Howe points out that all U.S. military operations had to be approved at the 
highest levels back in Washington.119 This fact leads one to the inevitable 
question. If the U.S. and U.N. had different objectives and there was no clear 
command channel for all forces in Somalia, how could anyone expect military 
and political goals to merge? 
What did this lack of clarity of objective lead to? War with Aideed's 
faction. Walter Clarke contends that Aideed realized that the U.S. would soon 
leave Mogadishu and leave the security of the city to a much less capable force. 
Therefore, he reluctantly agreed to the Addis Ababa accords to speed the 
Americans on their way so that he could take on the less capable U.N. forces.120 
Whether this was a preconceived strategy of Aideed's is debatable. However, 
it is clear that there were increased verbal and military attacks on U.N. forces 
on the heels of the UNITAF departure.121 
The U.N.'s and U.S.' opposing objectives created confusion among the 
U.S. leadership. Secretary of State Christopher sent Boutros-Ghali a letter from 
119Ibid, p. 23. 
120Clarke, "Uncertain Mandates." 
121
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the administration on 20 September, 1993. The letter stressed to Boutros-Ghali 
the importance of a political reconciliation effort and the withdrawal of U.S. 
forces as quickly as possible. In his reply, Boutros-Ghali was even more 
adamant about his mandate to capture Aideed.122 As Clinton and Christopher 
pushed Boutros-Ghali for a diplomatic solution with Aideed, Howe and U.S. 
Ambassador to the U.N. Madeline Albright were referring to Aideed as a 
"terrorist."123 The reference to Aideed as a terrorist, while obviously used as a 
tactic to inflame the public perception against Aideed, has wider implications 
for policy. By referring to Aideed as a terrorist, these senior administration 
personnel put constraints on how the president can react. The traditional U.S. 
position of not negotiating with terrorists limits the president's options if he 
acknowledges the senior officials comments as valid. Because of the 
inflammatory rhetoric used against Aideed up to this point may explain why the 
president did not heed the advice of former President Carter. 
Secretary of Defence Aspin attempted to calm fears of escalation due to 
the Ranger Task Force deployment saying that "unless we return security to 
south Mogadishu, political chaos will follow any U.N. withdrawal."124 After 
being in country for one day, the deployment of Task Force Ranger and their 
122Elaine Sciolino, "U.N. Chief Warning U.S. Against Pullout of Force in Somalia," The New York Times, 
October 1, 1993, p. 1-A. 
123 Keith Richburg, "UN Helicopter Assault in Somalia Targeted Aideed's Top Commanders," The Washington 
Post, July 16, 1993, p. Al. 
124John Lancaster, "Aspin Lists U.S. Goals in Somalia," The Washington Post, August 28, 1993, p. Al. 
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mission was leaked to the press.125 Clearly there was confusion about the goals 
of the U.S. among the policy makers in Washington. 
It appears that the U.S. was caught in a political situation where fully 
supporting the U.N. objectives in early 1993 was too risky domestically.126 But 
having trumpeted the multi-lateral and enlargement horn during his 
campaign127, and to back up this rhetoric, President Clinton threw the barking 
Boutros-Ghali a bone in the form of the American QRF and sent Ambassador 
Howe to hold his leash. 
The "subsequent twists and turns in American policy were difficult for 
the UN to absorb."128 The failure of the U.N. to adequately replace the 
American forces in the streets of Mogadishu created a security situation that 
would quickly lead to a dangerous situation in Mogadishu. The U.S. and other 
UNOSOM II forces seemed to take on a "bunker" mentality after UNITAF left. 
Street patrols in Mogadishu became much less frequent. Forces remained 
behind the protection of barbed wire and fortifications, departing only for 
necessary trips to other U.N. facilities. Even then, new routes were created that 
125Ibid. 
126Ann Devroy, "Collapse of U.S. Collective Action May Force Second Look at Bosnia," The Washington Post, 
8 October, 1993, p. A24. 
127
  See candidate Bill Clinton's " A New Covenant for American Security" speech delivered at Georgetown 
University on December 12, 1991. 
128Howe, p. 29. 
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circumvented the city streets.   Meanwhile the flow of weapons into the city 
increased and Aideed's faction grew stronger.129 
This was a direct result of the U.N. and the U.S. not having mutually 
supporting political objectives that could be turned into a cogent military 
strategy. There just was not time for the U.N. to replace the American forces. 
Aideed may have understood the dynamics of this situation when he decided 
to up the ante by attacking the Pakistani's in June.130 
E.        DOMESTIC SUPPORT 
The debates that raged in Congress after the October 3-4 battle were not 
indicative of the congressional support for the U.S. military presence in Somalia 
a scant 10 months earlier. Domestic political support was high for the U.S.-led 
humanitarian mission. "In the wake of sending humanitarian aid to Somalia, 
President Bush's approval rating went up to its highest levels since the Gulf 
War. His approval rating was 56% as he left office."131 President-elect Bill 
Clinton immediately endorsed the plan and it seemed that there was virtually 
no one against the humanitarian mission.132   Indeed, there seemed to be 
12
*The previous paragraph is based on my personal observations as a member of Task Force Ranger from 26 
August, 1993 - 22 October, 1993. In my discussions with members of the 10th Mountain Division, I learned that 
routine patrols in the city were substantially fewer in number than during the early part of UNOSOM II and 
steadily decreased as time went by. There was a general feeling that downtown Mogadishu was unsafe and that 
patrolling was a very dangerous proposition. 
,30Keith Richburg, "Aideed Exploited U.N.'s Failure to Prepare," The Washington Post, December 5, 1993, p. 
Al. 
l31Richard Benedetto, "Bush Approval Rating Up," U.S.A. Today, 14 Jan 1993, P. 8A. 
,32Woods, p. 14. 
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continued support for the U.S. mission right up until the ambush of the 
Pakistani forces on June 5. 
How then, if domestic support was not a problem, does this aspect of 
domestic support fit into the overall analytical methodology? Secondly, was 
domestic support a factor? The answer lies in the Clinton administration's 
perceptions of support for a policy that they were having a hard time 
articulating. As Clinton pushed for a quick departure of U.S. troops in March 
of 1993, it was obvious that his policy makers saw a collapse of support right 
around the corner.133 
In an effort to overcome the effects of this looming loss of support, the 
Clinton administration did two things. The first was to pull out most of the 
troops well before Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and Admiral Howe felt they 
should. The second was to be less than forthcoming with the American people 
about the roles of the remaining forces in Somalia. Actions by the Clinton 
administration were not so much effected by a real change in public support, 
but by pre-conceived notions about how public support would be effected by 
the U.S. involvement. Thomas Friedman points out that both the Bush and 
Clinton administrations "helped to produce the frenzy [in the wake of the 3-4 
133David T. Burbach, Presidential Approved and The Use of Force, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Defense and Arms Control Studies Program Working Paper, May 1994. In this study of public approval for the 
use of force, Burbach studied 78 uses of force beginning in 1953 with deployment of U.S. troops to help secure 
Japan to the outbreak of the ground war during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. In his study, he found that action 
to restore order in foreign countries was consistently less popular than actions to protect Americans or to defend 
American allies. In particular he found that Americans approve of protecting other Americans, are fairly 
supportive of defending allies, are a bit skeptical about punishing nations into changing their policies, and the 
public is quite negative towards restoring order in countries when American lives are not at stake. Therefore, 
Somalia type interventions are at the bottom of the list. 
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October fire-fight] by not leveling with the American people from the start that 
humanitarian intervention and nation-building are high-risk endeavors."134 
On the contrary, Bush had achieved broad consensus during his 
administration by first gaining the public support necessary and then using 
overwhelming military force to meet his clear objectives. Bush had learned this 
lesson during the Reagan years and during the U.S. victory in the Gulf War. 
The Clinton administration failed to articulate an evolving strategy to the 
American people as the situation in Mogadishu moved toward open conflict. 
Neither was there a real explanation to congress about why the U.S. was 
conducting combat raids in Somalia.135 
Mark Thompson points to a sensitive after action report compiled by 
Pentagon Analyst Michelle Flournoy as evidence that the objectives were not 
stated clearly, "From the day U.S. troops swarmed ashore, neither the American 
people nor Congress really had a firm fix,...on the U.S. interests at stake, the 
objectives sought, our strategy for achieving them and the risks associated with 
intervention....unaware of the mission creep, the public was outraged when 18 
U.S. soldiers died."136 
The administration had mislead the American people and the Congress, 
but at what price. That price was having to answer to the American people and 
Congress on the morning of October 4, 1993. After watching with disgust the 
134Friedman, p. 5c. 
13SHirsch & Oakley, p. 158. 
136Mark Thompson, 'The Past as Prelude," Time, September 19, 1994, p. 27. 
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scene of American soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, the 
people wanted answers. But administration fingers initially pointed to the U.N. 
or the U.S. military. Eventually, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin would bear the 
burden for the failure of U.S. policies.137 
There is one more element of domestic support that may have had a 
direct effect. Although not normally in the equation of calculating domestic 
support, it is one that bears analysis. Aideed was trained by the KGB during 
the early 1970s.138 He also worked with Americans when the Soviets dropped 
their support for the Somalis in the late 1970s.139 It is not surprising therefore 
that Aideed knew to specifically target U.S. domestic political support in an all 
out effort to overcome the U.S. political will. Ambassador Oakley feels that 
"There is no doubt that the militia leaders had studied not only Operation 
Desert Storm but Vietnam and Lebanon to understand the domestic political 
impact of American casualties."140 Keith Richburg quotes a senior aide to 
Aideed as saying that Aideed "made a calculated decision to kill American 
soldiers,"141 and that after the assault against Aideeds compound in July, "there 
'"Secretary Aspin resigned in December, 1993. 
138John M. Collins, "Somalia:   U.S./U.N. Military Options and Enemy Ripostes," CRS Report for Congress, 
October 14, 1993, p. 9. 
139Ibid, p. 10. 
140Hirsch & Oakley, p. 122. 
'"'Keith Richburg, "In War on Aideed, UN Battled Itself," The Washington Post, December 6, 1993, p. Al. 
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was no more United Nations, only Americans. If you could kill Americans, it 
would start problems in America directly."142 
The problem of possible American casualties is becoming an increasingly 
difficult psychological post-Cold War phenomenon. Edward Luttwak argues 
that U.S. citizens are not prepared to accept casualties as readily as in the past. 
He asserts that Americans do not perceive the problems of post-Cold War 
diplomacy to be as vital to U.S. security as the limited wars fought during the 
Cold War.143 Thomas Friedman takes a different and somewhat hard line view: 
"Some Americans seem to have forgotten in recent years that you join the Army 
not just to get a GI loan."144 Risks are inherent in military operations and one 
of the reasons that the military exists is to carry out the foreign policy 
objectives of the U.S. But whether it is right or wrong to participate in 
"humanitarian operations", "oil wars", or "wars against the forces of evil", U.S. 
leadership should be forthright with the American people about the risks 
involved when sending forces in harms way. 
142Ibid. 
143Luttwak, pp. 110-115. 
""Friedman, p. 5c. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The successes of United Task Force (UNITAF) and the subsequent 
failures of United Nations Somalia II (UNOSOM II) suggest important lessons 
in the uses of coercive diplomacy. The contrasts between the two operations 
offer an opportunity to analyze the divergent policies as they were applied to 
the same non-state actors. 
As the United States and the United Nations search for solutions to the 
ever-increasing problem of collapsed states, Type "D" Coercive Diplomacy, as 
conducted by the leaders of UNITAF may offer a viable policy alternative. 
UNITAF's stated objectives allowed them to satisfy those goals while actually 
reaching a bit beyond them, as evidenced by Ambassador Robert Oakley's use 
of coercive diplomacy in forcing faction leaders to the negotiating table. The 
U.S. and the U.N. were thus able to maintain their moral high ground of 
humanitarianism only, while additionally seeking a long-range solution to 
Somalia's problem. Yet UNITAFs goals were obtainable and morally just in the 
eyes of the supporting nations. If the goal is to simply stop the fighting, 
hunger, and lawlessness, it may be better to empower those with whom we do 
not necessarily agree, provided they have the capability to re-create order from 
within. 
To succeed in state re-structuring efforts, the desire for quick results may 
have to be replaced with long term commitments of a military force totally 
capable of maintaining or, if necessary, restoring the peace. In addition, the 
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diplomatic process must be tailored to the cultural environment of the 
population concerned. 
Clarity of objectives must be shaped by all major allies, and incorporated 
into the overall strategy of the countries involved in the intervention. The 
objectives and subsequently the policies that prevailed during UNITAF were 
definitely American ones. Although other nations participated, the U.S. 
leadership was responsible for carefully crafting the intervention objectives for 
the entire force. I do not advocate that the U.S. become responsible for leading 
all such interventions. But prior to allowing U.S. forces to become part of an 
international force, the U.S. has the responsibility to ensure that the stated 
objectives are obtainable and coalesce with their own. In Somalia, confusion 
over issues such as "nation building" and the role U.S. forces would play caused 
tremendous consternation between the U.S., the U.N. leadership, and the other 
U.N. forces. 
The outpouring of domestic support for the U.S. mission to Somalia in 
December, 1992 began deteriorating slowly and totally fell apart after the 
October 3-4 battle. Neither the American people nor the U.S. Congress was 
kept appraised of the expanded mandates and increasing role of U.S. forces to 
enforce them. They were simply not prepared for the events of 3-4 October and 
the result was complete reversal of U.S. policy and the resignation of the 
Secretary of Defence. 
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A.       POLICY CREATION 
Pre-conditions for successful coercive diplomacy may be somewhat 
misleading. The decision to use coercive diplomacy may not be as simple as 
analyzing the situation as it exists at any one moment. Ambassador Robert 
Oakley and the UNITAF leadership showed great aptitude for creating 
conditions for success. Policy makers and executors of those policies may well 
be able to influence these conditions with their actions. However, if, after 
analyzing the situation and the diplomatic and military options available, and 
the majority of the conditions do not exist and can not be created, another 
strategy would probably be more viable. 
Although all of the pre-conditions are important for success, Alexander 
George points out that the opponent's perceptions may be the most important 
ingredient that a policy maker must use to his advantage.145 In the five 
conditions for success advanced in this study, asymmetry of motivation 
addresses the opponent's perception most thoroughly. As advanced in this 
thesis, and in agreement with George, an asymmetry of motivation favoring or 
at least equal to that of an opponent is necessary for success. 




The following table represents the conclusions from my analysis as 
applied to the original George pre-conditions. 
Conditions That Favor CD UNITAF UNOSOMH 
Strong Motivation + - 
Asymmetry of motivation favoring 
the U.S./U.N.A 
+* - 
Clarity of Objective + - 
Sense of urgency to achieve the 
objectiveA 
+ - 
Adequate domestic political support + - 
Usable military options + - 
Opponent's fear of unacceptable 
escalation^ 
+ - 




"+" indicates the presence of the condition;"-" indicates that the condition was 
not present. 
*Motivation appeared to be equal 
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